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Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the
value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which
the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful abstraction for a number of realistic settings and
economic situations, such as modeling relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the
Shapley value have been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994]
value and the Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os [1997] value. In this context, the present article studies generalized
characteristic function games from the point of view of implementation and computation. Specifically, the
article makes two key contributions. First, building upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998],
we present a non-cooperative mechanism that implements both the Nowak-Radzik value and the Sa´nchez-
Bergantin˜os value in Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in expectations. Second, in order to facilitate an
efficient computation supporting the implementation mechanism, we propose the Generalized Marginal-
Contribution Nets representation for this type of game. This representation extends the results of Ieong
and Shoham [2006] and Elkind et al. [2009] for characteristic function games and retains their attractive
computational properties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games are an important model for many realistic economic situations that
capture the ability of players to take joint, coordinated actions. Typically, a coalitional
game model specifies payoffs attainable by various subsets (or coalitions) of players
cooperating within the game. Given these payoffs, fundamental game-theoretic re-
search questions concerning coalitional games include: (i) Which coalition will actually
form? (ii) How should the coalitional payoff be distributed among coalition members?
Moreover, assuming that desirable coalitions and payoff distribution methods exist:
(iii) How can we create a mechanism that implements a specific solution in an environ-
ment of self-interested players? Coalitional games also raise many important questions
from the computer-science perspective, key among them being: (iv) How to represent
games compactly? and (v) How to efficiently compute their solutions given such com-
pact representations [Chalkiadakis et al. 2011]. This article addresses questions (iii),
(iv), and (v) for coalitional games in the generalized characteristic function form as
introduced by Nowak and Radzik [1994]. This class of games generalizes characteristic
function games with transferable utility by distinguishing between different orders in
which players create coalitions. Thus, in this model, the value of a coalition depends
not only on its members, but also on the order in which those members joined the
coalition.
Generalized characteristic function form games naturally capture a number of real-
world situations. Consider, for example, a search on a social network where we need to
answer a question that only a few nodes can answer, and the question is propagated
through referrals along the connections of each node. This was the case, for instance,
with the recent TAG challenge [Rutherford et al. 2013; Rahwan et al. 2013], where
photos of five suspects were announced on a particular date, along with the name of
the city where each criminal was located, and the challenge was to take photos of as
many suspects as possible within 12 hours using referrals on social networks. In such
cases, the order in which nodes are added to the search influences the time required
to find an answer (e.g., the sooner the nodes with more connections join, the faster the
search becomes). As a second example, consider the cost-allocation problem studied
by Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os [1999], where a group of universities participating in a
joint research project invite a foreign expert for a visit. The budget of such a visit will
depend on the planned route, that is, the sequence in which the universities are to host
the researcher.
Clearly, situations such as these cannot be captured within a conventional coalitional
game model (i.e., a game in characteristic function form), where the value of a coalition
depends solely on the identity of its members, without considering the order in which
the members have joined it. Consequently, a growing body of work has considered gen-
eralized characteristic function games. In this context, a number of researchers have
focused on the issue of fair payoff division. The most well-known fair payoff division
concept in coalitional games is the Shapley value [Shapley 1953]. The basic idea is that
ai ’s payoff should be equal to ai ’s average marginal contribution, taken over all possi-
ble ways in which players could join the game (and contribute to the creation of each
coalition’s value). For instance, in the game of three players, there are altogether 3!
ways in which players could join the game: (i) a1,a2,a3, (ii) a1,a3,a2, (iii) a2,a1,a3,
(iv) a3,a1,a2, (v) a2,a3,a1, and (vi) a3,a2,a1. As such, there are 3! corresponding
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marginal contributions of a1: in (i) and (ii) a1 joins first (i.e., a1 contributes twice to
the empty set); in (iii) a1 joins after a2 (i.e., a1 contributes once to {a2}); in (iv) a1 joins af-
ter a3 (i.e., a1 contributes once to {a3}); finally in (v) and (vi) a1 joins last (i.e., a1 contribute
twice to {a2,a3}). The average of all these marginal contributions is the Shapley value
of a1.
There are two main extensions of the Shapley value to generalized characteristic
function games. The first was proposed by Nowak and Radzik [1994] (which we refer to
as the NR value), while the second was introduced by Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os [1997]
(which we refer to as the SB value). The difference between these values can be
seen in cases (v) and (vi) of the above 3-agent example. In particular, if v denotes
the characteristic function, and vg denotes the generalized characteristic function,
then:
—with the Shapley value, a1 contributes twice the difference between v({a2,a3}) and
v({a1,a2,a3});
—with the NR value, a1 contributes once the difference between vg(a2,a3) and
vg(a2,a3,a1), and contributes once the difference between vg(a3,a2) and vg(a3,a2,a1);
—with the SB value, a1 contributes twice the difference between the average value of a




One of the interesting applications of those two extensions is the recent body of
literature that uses game theoretic solution concepts to compute centralities of nodes
in networks [del Pozo et al. 2011; Amer et al. 2007, 2010]. In summary, by defining a
coalitional game with players being nodes of a network, and then computing a solution
for such a game, it is possible to obtain a measure of importance for individual nodes.
In this context, both the NR and SB values were used by del Pozo et al. [2011] to
study the centrality of nodes in directed social networks. These networks have recently
raised increasing attention as they can be used to model a variety of situations, ranging
from terrorist groups [Brams et al. 2006] to the spread of contagious diseases [Lentz
et al. 2012]. The crucial characteristics of these real-life network applications is that a
relationship between two nodes connected by an edge is asymmetric, that is, the edge
is directed. Consequently, in many cases, the worth of a coalition in a game defined
over such a network should depend not only on its members but also on the order in
which they were incorporated to this coalition. Del Pozo et al. [2011] took this into
account by defining a generalized characteristic function game over a network (instead
of a characteristic function game) and considering both NR and SB values as centrality
measures.
Although there have been a number of game-theoretic works (including the NR and
SB values) on generalized characteristic function games, the implementational and
the computational aspects of these games have not been yet studied. Both research
challenges can be summarized as follows:
—Implementation. Given a desired solution to a coalitional game (such as the Shapley
value), the issue of implementation deals with creating a set of rules (a mechanism)
that incentivizes self-interested players to reach the desired solution as a result of
equilibrium behavior. Although there exist various mechanisms implementing the
Shapley value and some of its various extensions, no mechanism for coalitional games
with ordered coalitions has been proposed to date.
—Computation. One of the key questions in generalized characteristic function games
is how to represent these games compactly. Clearly, a straightforward listing of the
values for all possible ordered coalitions requires space of size hyper-exponential
in the number of players. In contrast, a well-crafted representation may not only
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facilitate abstract reasoning but also may be able to capture certain patterns more
concisely, and may facilitate the development of significantly more efficient solu-
tions to challenging computational problems. Although a number of representa-
tions have been proposed in the computer-science and AI communities for various
classes of games [Deng and Papadimitriou 1994; Ohta et al. 2006, 2009; Conitzer and
Sandholm 2006; Greco et al. 2009; Ieong and Shoham 2006; Michalak et al. 2009],
no representation has been developed to date that facilitates faster computation of
the NR and SB values for generalized characteristic function games.
In order to apply a solution to a coalitional game in practice, it is necessary that both
of these two aspects (i.e., implementation and computation) are considered jointly (see,
e.g., Lehmann et al. [2002]). Indeed, the ability to compute the solution is of no use if
the players are not incentivized to use that solution in the first place. Similarly, having
the players agree to use a solution that cannot be efficiently computed is deprecating
its importance (in such cases, the players are forced to use approximation algorithms
that bring the unsolicited portion of uncertainty into their actions).
Against this background, this article is the first study of generalized characteris-
tic function games from the implementational and computational points of view. In
particular:
—We present a mechanism that implements the NR value and the SB value in ex-
pectations. Our mechanism is an extension of the mechanism by Dasgupta and
Chiu [1998], called Simple Demand Commitment Games, which implements the
Shapley value given that the characteristic function is strictly convex. We call our
extension Ordered Demand Commitment Games.
—We present a logic-based representation for generalized characteristic function
games. Our representation builds upon the marginal contribution nets (MC-Nets)
representation of Ieong and Shoham [2006] and its extension by Elkind et al. [2009].
MC-Nets have proven to be very efficient with respect to some important computa-
tional problems [Ieong and Shoham 2006; Michalak et al. 2010; Ohta et al. 2009],
especially the computation of the Shapley value. We demonstrate that our represen-
tation (which builds upon MC-Nets) is fully expressive, that is, it is able to represent
any generalized coalitional game. We also show that, for certain games, our repre-
sentation is exponentially more concise than the generalized function game repre-
sentation and that it can be used to efficiently compute both the NR value and the SB
value. Finally, as a sample application, we show how our representation facilitates
computations of game-theoretic betweeness centrality for directed networks based
on the NR and SB values.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
related literature. Section 3 provides notation and formal definitions of the Shapley
value and its two extensions to generalized characteristic function games (i.e., the
NR and SB values). In Section 4, we describe our mechanism for implementing both
values. The new representation is introduced and analyzed in Section 5. Conclusions
follow.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss three bodies of literature related to our work: (i) the literature
on noncooperative implementations of the Shapley value and its various extensions;
(ii) the computer-science literature on concise representations of coalitional games; and
(iii) the literature on further extensions of the Shapley value for generalized charac-
teristic function games.
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The issue of implementing the Shapley value has been studied in the literature by
a number of authors. Gul [1989] introduced a model of a transferable-utility economy
where two players make bilateral offers at random meetings. Assuming that the game is
strictly convex, with the time interval between meetings becoming arbitrarily small, the
Shapley value emerges as the limit for the expected payoff of each player in a Stationary
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SSPNE). This result holds also for strictly super-
additive games but only for the SSPNE reached by an immediate agreement [Gul
1989; Hart and Levy 1999]. A simplified mechanism of this kind was introduced by
Evans [1996].
An alternative mechanism, called the Simple Demand Commitment Game (SDCG),
was later on introduced by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998]. In this article, we will extend
SDCG to the generalized characteristic functions setting.
Assuming that the characteristic function is strictly convex, SDCG starts by ran-
domly choosing an order in which players are allowed to move. Then, the first player
in the chosen order makes a move which may or may not end the game. If the game
does not end, then the second player in the order makes another move (which again
may or may not end the game), and so on. In particular, the move that each player ai
makes is to select one of the following two options: (1) demand a payoff di that ai will
accept in return for joining any coalition, or (2) create a coalition consisting of ai and a
(possibly empty) subset of his choice out of the players that precede him in the order,
which automatically ends the game and forces every nonmember of that coalition to
form a singleton coalition.
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2001] proposed a mechanism that has some features
strictly better than the SDCG. In particular, while SDCG implements the Shapley
value in expected terms, in the mechanism by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein, the Shap-
ley value emerges in all equilibria. Furthermore, compared to Dasgupta and Chiu’s
mechanism, which requires strict convexity, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein’s mecha-
nism requires the characteristic function to be zero-monotonic, which is a weaker
condition. In more detail, the mechanism by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein involves
three steps. In Step 1, players bid by offering each other transfers, and the stake is
to become a proposer, that is, a player that has the sole right to divide the payoff
from the game. In Step 2, the winner (i.e., the highest net bidder) pays the transfers
promised to other players, and then proposes a division of the game’s payoff among the
players in the game. In Step 3, these players either accept or reject the proposal. If the
offer is rejected, the proposer is obliged to leave the mechanism and form a singleton
coalition. The remaining players follow the same procedure but for the now-smaller
game.
A number of follow-up works have built upon Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein’s
mechanism. In particular, a version of the mechanism that implements the Ordi-
nal Shapley value [Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein 2006] for n = 3 was proposed by
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]. To implement the Owen value, Vidal-Puga and
Bergantin˜os [2003] added a fourth step—a bidding phase to become leaders of a priori
given coalitions. A different fourth step was proposed by Ju and Wettstein [2007] in
order to implement the extension of the Shapley value to games with externalities
by Pham do and Norde [2007]. A similar approach followed in Macho-Stadler et al.
[2006, 2010]. Van den Brink and Funaki [2010] introduced a discounting parameter to
implement the discounted Shapley value.
The common and crucial feature of all the values that were implemented in the spirit
of the mechanism by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein is that they all meet a property
called the balanced contribution. Essentially, this property states that for any two
players, ai,aj , the worth of ai to aj is the same as the worth of aj to ai. More formally,
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focusing our attention on the Shapley value:1
φi(N, v) − φi(N− j, v) = φ j(N, v) − φ j(N−i, v), (1)
where φi(N, v) denotes the Shapley value of player ai in the coalitional game with
player set N and value function v, while, φi(N−i, v) denotes the Shapley value of player
ai in the coalitional game with player set N\{ai} and the same value function v.
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005] showed how that the balanced contribution
property allows for the construction of a mechanism in which the Shapley value
emerges as a result of equilibrium behavior. Unfortunately, it can be very easily demon-
strated that the balanced contribution property is not met by the NR value for games
in the generalized characteristic function form:
Example 2.1. Let N = {a1,a2} and vg((a1)) = 1, vg((a2)) = 2, vg((a1,a2)) = 3, and
vg((a2,a1)) = 8. To compute the Nowak and Radzik value, we average contributions of
the players to ordered coalitions over all permutations of players, that is over (a1,a2)
and (a2,a1). As a result of this computation, we find that the Nowak and Radzik
value of the first player is: φNR1 (N) = (1−0)+(8−2)2 = 3.5, and of the second players is:
φNR2 (N) = (2−0)+(3−1)2 = 2. Finally, it is easy to see that: φNR1 (N−2) = 1, and φNR2 (N−1) = 2.
Turning now to the computer-science literature on developing concise representa-
tions of coalitional games, Wooldridge and Dunne [2006] divide such representations
into two broad categories. The first category gives the characteristic function a spe-
cific interpretation in terms of combinatorial structures such as graphs. This is, for
instance, the approach adopted by Deng and Papadimitriou [1994], Greco et al. [2009],
and Wooldridge and Dunne [2006], and the advantage is that such representations are
guaranteed to be succinct. However, the disadvantage is that they are not always fully
expressive. The second category of representations is designed with the emphasis on
full expressivity at the expense of not being always succinct. In addition to MC-Nets
[Ieong and Shoham 2006; Elkind et al. 2009] and its various extensions [Michalak et al.
2010] to which our article also contributes, the second category includes the Synergy-
Coalition-Groups representation [Conitzer and Sandholm 2006; Ohta et al. 2009] and
the Algebraic-Decision-Diagrams representation [Aadithya et al. 2011; Sakurai et al.
2011]. A comprehensive discussion on representation formalisms for various classes of
coalitional games can be found in Chalkiadakis et al. [2011].
Although in this article we focus on exact computations, we note that there exist a
few approximation methods for the Shapley value and, potentially, some of them can be
extended to the NR and SB values. While most of such methods concern certain specific
subclasses of characteristic function games [Fatima et al. 2008; Bachrach et al. 2008],
the Monte Carlo approximation algorithm by Castro et al. [2009] can be efficiently
applied to all characteristic function games, provided that the worth of every coalition
can be computed in polynomial time. More specifically, instead of computing the average
marginal contribution of each player over all permutation (as in the definition of the
Shapley value), the algorithm approximates this average by considering only a subset of
permutations, sampled uniformly from the space of permutations. The approximation
error can be bounded, for example, if the variance of marginal contributions is known.
We believe this algorithm can be easily extended to approximate both the NR value
and the SB value. In particular, the algorithm should be modified such that, for each
sampled permutation, it computes the marginal contribution of each player to the
ordered coalition that precedes it in the permutation. For the NR value, this marginal
1Formula (1) remains the same for all the extensions of the Shapley value implemented in the spirit of
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein.
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contribution is awarded to the player that has joined the ordered coalition, while for
the SB value, the marginal contribution is distributed equally among the player and
the members of the ordered coalition it has joined. Such approximation algorithms
can be used in situations in which the game cannot be easily represented using our
generalized read-once MC-Nets formalism.
Finally, we mention other extensions of the Shapley value for generalized charac-
teristic function games developed after the Nowak-Radzik and Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os
values. In particular, a family of weighted Shapley values was studied by Bergantin˜os
and Sa´nchez [2001]. Furthermore, a parametric family of values (including both the
Nowak-Radzik and Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os values) was analyzed in a network context
by del Pozo et al. [2011].
3. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by describing the basic notation (Appendix B provides a comprehensive sum-
mary). Let N = {a1, . . . ,an} be the set of players in a coalitional game. Denote by 2N the
set of all subsets of N. An element of 2N is a coalition. An arbitrary coalition will often
be denoted C or D. The coalition involving all players in the game will be called the
grand coalition. A characteristic function v is a mapping v : 2N → R, that is, it assigns
to every coalition C ⊆ N a real number representing its value. We will assume that
v(∅) = 0. A game in characteristic function form is a pair (N, v). When there is no risk
of confusion, we will sometimes simply write v instead of (N, v).
For each coalition C ∈ 2N\{∅}, denote by (C) the set of all possible permutations of
the players in C. Any such permutation will be called an ordered coalition. An arbitrary
ordered coalition will often be denoted as T or S, while the set of all such coalitions
will be denoted T . That is, T = ⋃C∈2N (C). A generalized characteristic function vg
is a mapping vg : T → R, where it is assumed that vg(∅) = 0. A game in generalized
characteristic function form is a tuple (N, vg), and will sometimes be denoted by vg
alone. For some coalition D ⊆ N we will denote by T−D the set of all ordered coalitions
not containing players from D, formally: T−D =
⋃
C∈2N\D (C). Sometimes, we will write
ai instead of (ai) for brevity.
We will sometimes refer to the members of an ordered coalition T using their names,
for example, write T = (a5,a2,a3), while other times we may refer to them using
a lower case of the same letter: T = (t1, . . . , t|T |), meaning that ti is the ith agent
in T . Furthermore, given two disjoint ordered coalitions, T = (t1, . . . , t|T |) ∈ T and
S = (s1, . . . , s|S|) ∈ T , we write (T , S)k to denote the ordered coalition that results from
inserting S at the kth position in T . That is, (T , S)k = (t1, . . . , tk−1, s1, . . . , s|S|, tk, . . . , t|T |).
With a slight abuse of notation, we write (T ,ai)k to denote (T , (ai))k. Furthermore, we
write (ai,T ), and (T ,ai), to denote the ordered coalition that results from inserting ai
to T as the first player, and the last player, respectively.
For every coalition C ⊆ N and every permutation π = {π1, π2, . . . , π|π |} ∈ (C), we
introduce a function inv(π ) that returns the inverse of π . Formally, inv :
⋃
C⊆N (C) →⋃
C⊆N (C) is given by: inv(π ) = (π|π |, . . . , π2, π1). For instance, for π = (a3,a1,a5,a6), we
have inv(π ) = (a6,a5,a1,a3). Furthermore, given a permutation π ∈ (N) and a coali-
tion C ⊆ N, with a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by π (C) the ordered coalition
consisting of all the players in C ordered according to π , that is, it is the ordered coali-
tion that results after removing from π every player in N\C. For example, given π =
(a2,a1,a4,a3), andC = {a1,a2,a3}, we have π (C) = (a2,a1,a3). Moreover, given a general-
ized game (N, vg), and a permutation π ∈ (N), we denote by (N, vg,π ) the characteristic
function game in which, ∀C ⊆ N:
vg,π (C) = vg(π (C)). (2)
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For any (N, vg), we also introduce the characteristic function game (N, v¯g) which we





We will call v¯g, the average characteristic function of (N, vg).
Next, we extend the notion of a subset to ordered sets.
Definition 3.1. For any two ordered coalitions S = (s1, . . . , s|S|) ∈ T and T =
(t1, . . . , t|T |) ∈ T , we say that T is a subset of S, and write T ⊆ S, if and only if T
is a subsequence of S, that is, the following two conditions hold.
—Every member of T is a member of S. More formally:
∀ti ∈ T , ∃sk ∈ S : sk = ti.
—For any two players, ti, tj ∈ T , if ti appears before tj in T , then ti also appears before
tj in S. More formally:
∀ti, tj ∈ T : i < j, ∃sk, sw ∈ S : k < w and sk = ti and sw = tj .
Following convention, we say that T is a strict subset of S, and write T ⊂S (instead
of T ⊆S), if these two conditions are met, and T 
= S.
Now, we are ready to introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.2. A characteristic function game (N, v) is said to be convex if, for every
two coalitions C, D : D ⊂ C and for every ai ∈ N\C, the following holds:
v(C ∪ {ai}) − v(C) ≥ v(D∪ {ai}) − v(D).
Furthermore, (N, v) is said to be strictly convex if:
v(C ∪ {ai}) − v(C) > v(D∪ {ai}) − v(D).
We extend the notion of convexity to the generalized characteristic function games
as follows.
Definition 3.3. A generalized characteristic function game (N, vg) is said to be con-
vex if, for every two ordered coalitions S,T : T ⊂ S and for every ai ∈ N\S, we have
vg((S,ai)s) − vg(S) ≥ vg((T ,ai)t) − vg(T ),
whenever (T ,ai)t is a subset of (S,ai)s. More formally, the inequality holds for every
t ∈ {1, . . . , |T | + 1}, s ∈ {1, . . . , |S| + 1} : (T ,ai)t ⊂ (S,ai)s. Furthermore, (N, vg) is said
to be strictly convex if
vg((S,ai)s) − vg(S) > vg((T ,ai)t) − vg(T ).
Now, we briefly describe the Shapley value for characteristic function games, and
then present its extensions to generalized characteristic function games. The Shapley
value was proposed as a normative scheme for dividing the value of the game fairly
among the players. In more detail, the Shapley value of a player ai ∈ N, denoted
φi(N, v), is ai ’s share of the grand coalition’s payoff, which is computed as the average
marginal contribution of that player over all possible joining orders (assuming that the
agents have joined the game sequentially, one agent at a time). Formally:
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where v(C←−πi ,ai) is the marginal contribution of a player ai to a coalition C←−πi consisting
of all the players that are in permutation π before ai. Formally:
v(C←−πi ,ai) = v(C←−πi ∪ {ai}) − v(C←−πi ). (5)
Importantly, as visible from Eq. (4), if π ∈ (N) was selected uniformly at random, the
Shapley value of player ai would be the expected marginal contribution of ai to C←−πi .
That is, φi(N, v) = E[C←−πi ,i], where E[·] is the expectation operator.




(|N| − |C| − 1)!(|C|!)
|N|! v(C ∪ {ai}) − v(C). (6)
This is more computationally efficient than Eq. (4), because the sum is over coalitions,
not permutations. When there is no risk of confusion, instead of φi(N, v), we will write
φi(v) or φi for brevity. This also concerns the extensions of the Shapley value that will
be presented later on in this section.
The Shapley value is “fair” in the sense that it is the unique solution that has the
following axioms.
Symmetry. The payoffs do not depend on the players’ names. That is, φ(π (v)) = π (φ)(v)
for every game v and permutation π ∈ (N).
Null Player. The players that make no contribution should receive nothing. In other
words, we have (∀C ⊆ N,v(C←−πi ,ai) = 0) ⇒ (φi(N) = 0).
Efficiency. The entire payoff of the grand coalition should be distributed among its
members. That is,
∑
ai∈N φi(N) = v(N).
Additivity. Given three games, (N, v1), (N, v2) and (N, v3), where v1(C) = v2(C) +
v3(C), it holds that, for all C ⊆ N, the payoff of a player in (N, v1) is the sum of its
payoffs in (N, v2) and in (N, v3).
Whereas these four axioms uniquely determine the Shapley value for characteristic
function games, the situation is more complex for generalized games, because a player’s
marginal contribution (and consequently the null-player axiom) depends on where
the new player in the coalition is placed. In this respect, Nowak and Radzik [1994]
developed an extension of the Shapley value by making perhaps the most natural
assumption that the marginal contribution of a player is computed when this player
is placed last in the coalition. Let us denote this marginal contribution of ai to T ∈
T (N\{ai}) in game vg (according to Nowak and Radzik’s definition) as NRvg (T ,ai). Then:
NRvg (T ,ai) = vg((T ,ai)) − vg(T ). (7)
In what follows, for any ordered coalition, T , let T (ai) denote the sequence of players in
T that appear before ai (if ai /∈ T then T (ai) = T ). For example, given T = (a1,a3,a4,a6),
we have T (a4) = (a1,a3). Using this notation, the Nowak-Radzik value (or the NR value
for short) is defined as follows:










This can be written differently as follows:





(|N| − |T | − 1)!
|N|! [vg((T ,ai)) − vg(T )]. (9)
The NR value is the unique value that satisfies the following “fairness” axioms:
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i (vg) = 1|N|!
∑
T∈(N) vg(T );
Null-Player. ∀ai ∈ N, if vg(T ) = vg((T ,ai)) ∀T ∈ T : ai /∈ T , then φNRi (vg) = 0;
Additivity. φNR(vg + v′g) = φNR(vg) + φNR(v′g) for any two functions, vg and v′g.
Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os [1997] developed an alternative extension of the Shapley
value based on the definition of the marginal contribution, where, instead of assuming
that this player will be placed last, the authors take the average over all possible
positions in which the player can be placed:
SBvg (T ,ai) :=
1
(|T | + 1)
|T |+1∑
l=1
[vg((T ,ai)l) − vg(T )]. (10)
The Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os value (or SB value for short) is then computed as










This also can be rewritten differently as follows:





(|N| − |T | − 1)!
|N|!(|T | + 1)
|T |+1∑
l=1
[vg((T ,ai)l) − vg(T )]. (12)
As noted by Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os [1997], their value for vg is equivalent to the
Shapley value of the average game of vg (see Eq. (3) for the definition of the average
game), that is,
φSBi (N, vg) = φi(N, v¯g) = E[v¯g (C←−πi ,ai)]. (13)
The SB value is the unique value that satisfies NR’s efficiency and additivity axioms
and the following axioms:
Null-Player. If ∀T ∈ T ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , |T | + 1} : vg((T ,ai)l) = vg(T ), then φSBi (vg) = 0;
Symmetry. If ∀T ∈ T−{i, j}∀l ∈ {1, . . . , |T | + 1} : vg((T ,ai)l) = vg((T ,aj)l), then
φSBi (vg) = φSBj (vg).
The difference between the NR and SB values is illustrated in the following
example:
Example 3.4. Consider a game with an ordered coalition T ∗ ∈ (N) such that
vg(T ) = 1 if T = T ∗ and vg(T ) = 0 otherwise. Then, the average value of the grand
coalition, taken over all possible orders, which is 1n! , needs to be distributed among
the players. Using the NR value, we get φNRt (N) = 1n! , where at is the last player in
the ordered coalition T ∗, and we get φNRi (N) = 0 for all ai ∈ N\{at}. In contrast, using
the SB value, we get φSBi (N) = 1n!·|T ′| = 1n!·n for all ai ∈ N. As can be seen, in this example,
the NR value rewards the last player in the order, whereas the SB value rewards all
players equally.
Having introduced the Shapley value and its extensions to generalized characteristic
function games, in the following section, we consider the issue of implementation.
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4. IMPLEMENTATION
Among the many deeply studied aspects of the Shapley value is whether there ex-
ists a set of rules (or a mechanism) that incentivizes self-interested players to adopt
the Shapley value as a result of equilibrium behavior.2 In this section we propose a
mechanism to implement the NR and SB values in Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPNE).3 We build upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998].
Given a characteristic function game v, Dasgupta and Chiu’s mechanism is called the
Simple Demand Commitment Game, denoted by SDCG(v). The mechanism proposed
in this section modifies it to handle ordered coalitions, that is, to handle a generalized
characteristic function game vg. As such, we call this mechanism Ordered Demand
Commitment Game. It has two versions, one for the NR value (called ODCGNR(vg)) and
the other for the SB value (called ODCGSB(vg)). Section 4.1 presents ODCGNR(vg), while
Section 4.2 presents ODCGSB(vg). Section 4.3 proves that each mechanism implements
its respective value, and that each of the aforementioned strategies is, in fact, an
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE).
4.1. The ODCGNR(vg) Mechanism
The mechanism ODCGNR(vg) has two main steps.
—Step 1. An order of players is chosen uniformly at random out of all possible orders.
Without loss of generality, let the chosen order be π = (a1, . . . ,an).
—Step 2. The first player in π (i.e., a1) makes the first move, then the second player in π
(i.e., a2) makes the second move (unless a1 has terminated the game), then the third
player in π (i.e., a3) makes the third move (unless the game has been terminated
before his turn), and so on. The move of every ai : 1 ≤ i < n involves choosing one of
the following two options:
—Option 1. Specify a “demand” di ∈ R—an amount of utility that ai will accept in
return for joining any coalition. The mechanism then proceeds to the subsequent
player in the order, that is, ai+1.
—Option 2. Select a subset C ⊆ {a1, . . . ,ai−1} that ai wants to join. This terminates
the game with the following outcome: Coalition inv(π (C∪{ai})) forms, and its payoff
is divided as follows: Every ak ∈ C receives dk, while ai receives:




In other words, ai pays the members their demands, and takes the surplus for
himself. As for non-members, every aj ∈ N\(C ∪ {ai}) is left with no choice but to
form the singleton coalition {aj} and receive the payoff vg((aj)).
Player an on the other hand has only one choice, which is Option 2.
Note that this mechanism is a game of perfect information, as the chosen order is
made publicly known before any player makes a move. Step 2 of ODCGNR(vg) and
ODCGSB(vg) will be denoted by ODCGNRπ (vg) and ODCG
SB
π (vg), where π is the order
chosen in Step 1.
2This is part of the Nash program, which tries to provide a non-cooperative foundation for cooperative
solution concepts [Serrano 2004].
3The SPNE of a game G are all strategy profiles s such that for any subgame G′ of G, the restriction of s to
G′ is a Nash Equilibrium of G′. For more details, see Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2009].
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Table I. A Comparison between the SDCG Mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998] and Our ODCGNR(vg)
and ODCGSB(vg) Mechanisms
Coalition created





C ∈ {a1, . . . ,ai−1} C ∪ {ai}
∀ak ∈ C : pk = dk
pi = v(C ∪ {ai}) −
∑





C ∈ {a1, . . . ,ai−1}
inv(π(C ∪ {ai}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C ∪ {ai} ordered as inverse of π
∀ak ∈ C : pk = dk
pi = vg(inv(π(C ∪ {ai}))) −
∑





C ∈ {a1, . . . ,ai−1}
π˜(C ∪ {ai})︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C ∪ {ai} ordered at random)
∀ak ∈ C : pk = dk
pi = vg(π˜ (C ∪ {ai})) −
∑
ak∈C dk∀ak ∈ N\{C ∪ {ai}} : pk = vg((ak)).
In Step 1 of all three mechanisms, a permutation of players π is chosen randomly to determine the
order of moves (the ith player in π makes the ith move). Without loss of generality, the table assumes
π = (a1,a2, . . . ,an). In Step 2, the move of ai is to make a choice between (1) demanding di in return for
joining any coalition requested by a subsequent player, and (2) forming a coalition with (some of) the
previous players and ending the game. The main difference is in the way the mechanisms impose an
order on the resulting multiplayer coalition.
4.2. The ODCGSB(vg) Mechanism and the σSBπ,i Strategy
The ODCGSB(vg) mechanism is identical to ODCGNR(vg) except for the following differ-
ence. In Option 2, the payoff of player ai in Eq. (14) becomes:




where π˜(C ∪ {ai}) is an ordered coalition chosen uniformly at random from the set
C∪{ai}. This means ai can choose the identities (but not the order) of the agents who will
join him in the same coalition. The order will be chosen randomly by the mechanism,
only after the members are chosen by ai.
Table I summarizes the differences between the SDCG mechanism proposed by
Dasgupta and Chiu [1998] and the ODCGNR and ODCGSB mechanisms proposed in
this article, where pk denotes the payoff of ak.
4.3. Properties of the Mechanisms
Our key results with regards to the ODCGNR(vg) and ODCGSB(vg) mechanisms are
presented in the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.1. Every SPNE of ODCGNR(vg) and ODCGSB(vg), where vg is strictly
convex, has payoffs equal to the NR value, and the SB value, respectively.
PROOF. We start by recalling Eqs. (4), (8), and (13) in which either the Shapley value,
the NR value or the SB value, respectively, are presented as the expected marginal
contribution of player ai in permutation π , where π ∈ (N) is selected uniformly at
random. While this general functional form is the same for all three values, their
differences stem:
—From the Different Underlying Value Function. In the case of the Shapley value this
is the characteristic function v, whereas in the case of the NR value this is the
generalized characteristic function vg, and in the case of the SB value this is the
average characteristic function for vg, that is, it is v¯g; and
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—From the Different Definition of the Marginal Contribution. In the case of the Shapley
value and the SB value, we have v(C←−πi ,ai) and v¯g (C←−πi ,ai), respectively (Eq. (5) for
the value function v and v¯g), whereas, for the NR value, we have NRvg (T ,ai) (Eq. (7)).
Step 1 of both our mechanisms is the same as Step 1 of the mechanism by Dasgupta
and Chiu [1998]: a permutation π is chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, what we
need to show for each value is that our refinements account for the differences in the
value function and the marginal contribution as outlined previously. To this end, let us
consider the following lemmas:
LEMMA 4.1.1. Given (N, vg), let π ∈ (N) be an order of players chosen uniformly at
random in Step 1 of ODCGNR(vg) (ODCGSB(vg)). Then, for every player ai ∈ N, Step 2
of the mechanism, that is, ODCGNRπ (vg) (ODCG
NR
π (vg)), is strategically equivalent to
SDCGπ (vg,π ) (SDCGπ (v¯g)).
PROOF. We consider ODCGNR(vg) first. By rules of this mechanism (see Table I), any
coalition C ∪ {ai} chosen by ai in Option 2 will be created as an ordered coalition
inv(π (C ∪ {ai})). Thus, the choices offered to ai by ODCGNR(vg), that is, every inv(π (C ∪
{ai})) in the generalized characteristic function game vg, are in fact equivalent to the
choices offered to ai by SDCG(vg,inv(π)), that is, every C ∪ {ai} in the characteristic
function game vg,inv(π). This shows that Step 2 of ODCG
NR(vg) is strategically equivalent
to Step 2 of SDCG(vg,inv(π)).
Turning now to ODCGSB(vg), by rules of this mechanism (see again Table I), any
coalition C ∪ {ai} chosen by ai in Option 2 will be created as an ordered coalition
(ai, π˜ (C)). Recall that π˜ (C) denotes a randomly ordered coalition made of players in C.
Since player ai has to select C without knowing how it will be ordered, his rational
behavior is to consider the expected value of C ∪ {ai} over all possible orders of C,
bearing in mind that he will be placed in the first position of the ordered coalition (as






which is precisely v¯g(C ∪ {ai}) (see Section 3). Thus, the choices offered to ai by
ODCGSB(vg), that is, every (ai, π˜ (C)) in the generalized characteristic function game
vg, are equivalent to the choices offered to ai by SDCG(v¯g), that is, every C ∪ {ai} in the
characteristic function game v¯g. This shows that Step 2 of ODCGSB(vg) is strategically
equivalent to Step 2 of SDCG(v¯g).
LEMMA 4.1.2. Given a (strictly) convex ordered game (N, vg), and a permutation π ∈
(N), the game (N, vg,π ) is (strictly) convex.
PROOF. We need to show that:
vg,π (C ∪ {ai}) − vg,π (C) (>) ≥ vg,π (D∪ {ai}) − vg,π (D), (15)
where ai ∈ N\C and D ⊂ C ⊂ N.
To this end, observe that every member of D appears in C, and if a player, ai, appears
before another, aj , in π (D), then it will also appear before it in π (C), as both coalitions
are ordered according to π . Therefore, based on Definition 3.1, we have: π (D) ⊂π (C).
By a similar reasoning, we have π (C ∪ {ai}) ⊂π (D ∪ {ai}). This, as well as the fact that
vg is convex, implies the following (based on Definition 3.3):
vg(π (C ∪ {ai})) − vg(π (C)) (>) ≥ vg(π (D∪ {ai})) − vg(π (D)). (16)
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Moreover, by definition, we have vg,π (C) = vg(π (C)) for every C ⊆ N. This, together
with Eq. (16), imply that Eq. (15) holds.
LEMMA 4.1.3. Given a (strictly) convex ordered game (N, vg), and a permutation π ∈
(N), the game (N, v¯g) is (strictly) convex.
PROOF. We know from Lemma 4.1.2 that, for all π ∈ (N) and all ai ∈ N, we have:
vg,π (C ∪ {ai}) − vg,π (C) (>) ≥ vg,π (D∪ {ai}) − vg,π (D),





(vg,π (C ∪ {ai}) − vg,π (C)) (>) ≥ 1|N|!
∑
π∈(N)
(vg,π (D∪ {ai}) − vg,π (D)). (17)





(vπ (C)) = 1|C|!
∑
π∈(C)
(vπ (C)) = v¯g(C). (18)
Equations (17) and (18) mean that
v¯g(C ∪ {ai}) − v¯g(C) (>) ≥ v¯g(D∪ {ai}) − v¯g(D).
Next, building upon the above lemmas, as well as the result of Dasgupta and
Chiu [1998], we prove the correctness of Theorem 4.1.
Dasgupta and Chiu [1998] showed that, for a convex characteristic function game v,
all the SPNE of their mechanism, SDCG(v), result in the Shapley value in expectation.
They also showed that in the equilibrium any player ai in the randomly chosen order
π (except for the last player) makes a demand that equals his contribution to the
coalition consisting of all subsequent players in π (we will denote this coalition by
C−→πi ). For instance, given ({a1,a2,a3}, v) and π = (a2,a1,a3), player a2 demands d2 =
v(C−→π2 ,a2) = v({a1,a3} ∪ {a2}) − v({a1,a3}), and player a1 demands d1 = v(C−→π1 ,a1) =
v({a3} ∪ {a1}) − v({a3}). The last player in π , that is, a3, forms the grand coalition,
{a1,a2,a3}, and satisfies the demands of a1 and a2, leaving him with a payoff equal to
his marginal contribution to the empty set. That is, a3 receives:
v({a1,a2,a3}) − d2 − d1 = v({a3}),
or, equivalently, v(C−→π3 ,a3) = v(∅ ∪ {a3}) − v(∅).











v(C←−πi ,ai)m= E[C←−πi ,i], (19)
the SDCG(v) mechanism implements the Shapley value in expectation (see Eq. (4)).
From this result of Dasgupta and Chiu, as well as Lemmas 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, it follows
that, for a convex generalized characteristic function, vg, all SPNE of our mechanism
ODCGNR(vg) result in expectation in the following value:





vg,inv(π) (C−→πi ,ai), (20)
while all SPNE of our mechanism ODCGSB(vg) result in expectation in





v¯g (C−→πi ,ai). (21)
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Equations (20) and (21) imply that, in order to prove Theorem 4.1, it suffices to prove
that, the following two equations hold for all ai ∈ N:










NRvg (T (ai),ai) = φNRi (N, vg), (22)
and










v¯g (C←−πi ,ai) = φSBi (N, vg). (23)
Since the correctness of Eq. (23) is implied by Eq. (19), it remains to prove the
correctness of Eq. (22). We will do it with the following lemma.
LEMMA 4.1.4. Given (N, vg) and ai ∈ N, there exists a bijection fi : (N) → (N)
such that for all π ∈ N:
vg,inv(π) (C−→πi ,ai) = NRvg ( fi(π )(ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=T (ai )
,ai). (24)
PROOF. Let fi be defined as follows: for every π = (ak1 , . . . ,aki−1 ,aki ,aki+1 , . . . ,akn) ∈
(N), where aki = ai, we have fi(π ) = inv(π ) = (akn, . . . ,aki+1 ,aki ,aki−1 , . . . ,ak1 ). For this
bijection, the right-hand side of Eq. (24) becomes:
NRvg ( fi(π )(ai),ai) = NRvg (inv(π )(ai),ai) = vg((akn, . . . ,aki−1 ,aki )) − vg((akn, . . . ,aki−1 )).
As for the left-hand side of Eq. (24), we have
vg,inv(π) (C−→πi ,ai) = vg,inv(π)(C−→πi ∪ {ai}) − vg,inv(π)(C−→πi )
= vg,inv(π)({aki ,aki+1 , . . . ,an}) − vg,inv(π)({aki+1 , . . . ,akn}). (25)
Since, by definition, we have vg,π (C) = vg(π (C)) for all C ⊆ N, we can rewrite Eq. (25)
as follows:
vg,inv(π) (C−→πi ,ai) = vg(inv(π )({aki ,aki+1 , . . . ,an}) − vg(inv(π )({aki+1, . . . ,akn}))
= vg((akn, . . . ,aki−1 ,aki )) − vg((akn, . . . ,aki−1 )). (26)
Hence, Eq. (24) holds.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
In the next section, we will discuss equilibrium strategies.
4.4. Strategies in the ODCGNR(vg) and ODCGSB(vg) Mechanisms
In section, we present an equilibrium strategy of player ai. It has two versions; one for
ODCGNR(vg), denoted by σNRπ,i , and the other for ODCG
SB(vg), denoted by σSBπ,i . Before
we introduce these strategies, we need to introduce additional notation. Let Hi = Ri−1
be the set of all possible histories that ai may face; every history in Hi represents a
unique set of demands (d1, . . . ,di−1). Now, let ai face the history h = (d1, . . . ,di−1) and
let D be any subset of players from {ai,ai+1, . . . ,an}. We define MNRh,π (D) as follows:
MNRh,π (D) = max
C⊆{a1,...,ai−1}
⎧⎨






That is, MNRh,π (D) is the maximum payoff that coalition D can obtain for itself if
it is allowed to choose a set of new members, denoted by C, from the players
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that precede ai, bearing in mind that the mechanism will enforce the formation of
inv(π (D ∪ C)). Furthermore, for every j ∈ {i, . . . ,n}, let Phπ (i, j) denote the following
linear program:
Phπ (i, j) : maxdi ,...,dj di subject to:
dk1 +· · · + dkm ≥ MNRh,π ({ak1 , . . . ,akm}) for all k1, . . . ,km where i ≤ k1 < · · · < km ≤ j
and di + · · · + dj = MNRh,π ({ai, . . . ,aj}).
In other words, Phπ (i, j) computes for players ai, . . . ,aj and characteristic function
MNRh,π (·) a core allocation that gives ai the largest payoff. Next, we outline the condi-
tions that characterize the maximal program for player ai.
Definition 4.2. Given a history h = (d1, . . . ,di−1), a program Phπ (i, j) for player ai is
called a maximal program if
—there exists a solution (di, . . . ,dj) for Phπ (i, j), that is, the program is feasible.4
—no other feasible program Phπ (i,k) : k 
= j has a greater objective-function value;
—no other feasible program Phπ (i,k) : k > j has the same objective-function value.
This definition implies that every maximal program is unique. We are now ready
to introduce our strategy. Recall that every ai : 1 ≤ i < n must choose between two
options: either to specify a demand or select a subset of {a1, . . . ,ai−1}, while an has only
one option, which is to select a subset from {a1, . . . ,an−1}). This implies that a strategy
of ai : 1 ≤ i < n is a mapping from Hi to R ∪ 2{a1,...,ai−1}, while a strategy of an is a
mapping from Hn to 2{a1,...,an−1}. Our strategy, σNRπ,i , proceeds as follows:
—If Phπ (i, j) is maximal, where j > i, then demand the value of the objective function
in Phπ (i, j)
—If Phπ (i, i) is maximal, then form the ordered coalition inv(π (C∗ ∪ {ai})), where C∗
solves:
MNRh,π ({ai}) = max
C⊆{a1,...,ai−1}
⎧⎨






If there are more than one such argmaxes, then, following Dasgupta and Chiu [1998],
we adopt the lexicographic tie-breaking rule.
As for the strategy σSBπ,i , it is identical to σ
NR
π,i except for the following difference. Every
MNRh,π (D) is replaced with M
SB
h,π (D), which is defined as follows:













In this section, we consider the issue of efficient computation of the NR and SB val-
ues. Recall that a straightforward computation of the NR value, using either formulas
(9) or (8), requires iterating over all ordered coalition. The same holds for the SB





)× i!) ordered coalitions,
4We note that the trivial program Phπ (i, i) is always feasible.
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such an approach quickly becomes prohibitive with increasing n.5 To tackle this com-
putational problem, we introduce in this section a compact representation scheme for
games with ordered coalitions and evaluate its properties. We take as our starting
point the marginal contribution nets (MC-Nets) representation by Ieong and Shoham
[2006] and its extension, read-once marginal contribution nets (or read-once MC-
Nets) by Elkind et al. [2009]. This representation has a number of desirable prop-
erties: it is fully expressive, concise for many characteristic function games of interest,
and facilitates a very efficient technique for computing the Shapley value. Our rep-
resentation, which we call generalized read-once MC-Nets, also has these desirable
properties.
This section is divided into four subsections. In Section 5.1, we introduce the general-
ized read-once MC-Nets representation to represent generalized characteristic function
games compactly. After that, in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we prove that this representation
facilitates an efficient computation of the NR value and the SB value, respectively. Fi-
nally, in Section 5.4, we present a sample application of generalized read-once MC-Nets
to compute game-theoretic centrality based on the NR and SB values.
5.1. Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
Before presenting our representation (for generalized characteristic function games),
we provide a brief description of MC-Nets (for characteristic function games). Specifi-
cally, with MC-Nets, a game is represented by a set of rulesR, where each rule is of the
form Formula −→ V in which Formula is a propositional formula over N, and V is a
real number. A coalition C is said to meet a given formula F if and only if F evaluates
to true when the values of all Boolean variables that correspond to players in C are set
to true, and the values of all Boolean variables that correspond to players not in C are
set to false. We write C |= F to mean that C meets F . In MC-Nets, if coalition C does
not meet any rule then its value is 0. Otherwise, the value of C is the sum of every V





Ieong and Shoham [2006] showed that, given an MC-Net representation in which rules
are made only of conjunctions of positive and/or negative literals, the Shapley value can
be computed in time linear in the number of rules. Similarly to Elkind et al. [2009], we
will call such rules “basic rules”, and the representation based on them basic MC-Nets.
Any basic rule can be written as z∧¬z′ → V , where z and z′ are conjunctions of positive
and negative literals, respectively. Now, taking advantage of the additivity property of
the Shapley value, every basic rule can be considered separately as a game on its own.




|¬z′|(|z|+|¬z′ ||z| ) . (30)
respectively, where |z| and |¬z′| denote the number of elements in z and ¬z′ respectively.
Elkind et al. [2009] defined a class of MC-Net rules, called read-once MC rules, which
are considerably more succinct than basic rules, while enjoying similarly attractive
5For instance, the size of the generalized characteristic function for n = 5 is 325, whereas for n = 10 is
9864100.
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computational properties. The syntax of read-once Boolean formulas is as follows:
A := ai | ¬ai i ∈ {1 . . .n},
F := (F) | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | F ⊕ F | A ,
where each literal ai can only appear once. In other words, this formula is a binary
rooted tree with positive or negative literals on leafs and internal nodes labeled with
one of the following logical connectives: conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) and exclusive
disjunction (⊕).
Elkind et al. [2009] proved that, in general MC-Nets, where each literal can appear
in a formula many times, the problem of computing the Shapley value is intractable
(i.e., NP-hard). However, for the read-once Boolean formulas, the authors presented a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Shapley value.
Having presented the MC-Net representation for characteristic function games, we
now present our extension of MC-Nets to generalized characteristic function games.
More specifically, we extend the rules so that the Formula on the left-hand side of a
rule is applicable to an ordered coalition. We introduce two atomic formulas:
basic atomic formula (BAF) {am, . . . ,an},
ordered atomic formula (OAF) 〈ai, . . . ,aj〉.
The ordered coalition T meets a basic atomic formula, denoted FBAF, if all literals
occurring in FBAF belong to T . More formally
T |= FBAF ⇐⇒ ∀ai ∈ FBAF,ai ∈ T .
Example 5.1. Let N = {a1, . . . ,a10} and consider T = (a5,a1,a4,a3,a2). We have
T  {a2,a5},
T  {a5,a2,a4,a6}.
Now, we introduce an ordered atomic formula, denoted FOAF. This formula is our
crucial extension to MC-Nets; it allows us to fully express the values of all ordered
coalitions. Specifically, the ordered coalition T meets FOAF if all literals occurring in
FOAF appear in T in the same order as in the FOAF formula.
To state this more formally, let us first introduce the notion of an ordered coalition
corresponding to FOAF. To this end, for every FOAF = 〈ai, . . . ,aj〉, the corresponding
ordered coalition of FOAF is simply SOAF = (ai, . . . ,aj). The main difference between
the two is that ai is a literal inFOAF, while it is an agent in SOAF. Now, given a particular
FOAF and an ordered coalition SOAF corresponding to it, the following holds for every
T ∈ T :
T |= FOAF ⇐⇒ SOAF ⊆T .
In other words, SOAF is a subsequence of T . This has a natural interpretation: when
a group of players joins any coalition in a certain order they contribute to it a certain
value. Consider the following example.
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Now, we are able to formalize our representation which we call the generalized read-
once MC-Nets. Specifically, in this representation, a rule, called generalized read-once
rule, is as follows:
F → V, (31)
where V is a real value and the syntax of the generalized formula F is:
A := FBAF | FOAF,
F := (F) | ¬F | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | F ⊕ F | A,
and each literal can only appear once in the formula. This generalized formula is
a binary rooted tree with atomic formulas on leafs and internal nodes labeled with
one of the following logical connectives: conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) or exclusive
disjunction (⊕). The logical connectives have the following standard interpretation:
T  ¬F ⇐⇒ T  F ,
T  F1 ∧ F2 ⇐⇒ T  F1 and T  F2,
T  F1 ∨ F2 ⇐⇒ T  F1 or T  F2,
T  F1 ⊕ F2 ⇐⇒ T  (F1 ∨ F2) ∧ ¬(F1 ∧ F2).
Example 5.3. Let N = {a1, . . . ,a10} and consider T = (a5,a1,a4,a3,a2). We have
T  ({a2,a5} ∧ 〈a1,a3〉) ∨ {a4,a7,a9},
T  〈a4,a5,a3〉 ⊕ ({a1} ∧ ¬{a2}).
A generalized coalitional game (N, v) can be represented by a tuple (N,GR), where
GR is a finite set of generalized rules. The value vg(T ) of an ordered coalition T is






The following example presents a simple application of generalized read-once MC-Nets
to the scheduling problem.
Example 5.4. Let G = (V, E) be a directed acyclic graph representing a task-based
domain, where each vertex in V = {v1, . . . , vn} represents a task. Each edge (vi, v j) ∈ E
illustrates that task vi has to be completed before task v j . We say that the job is done
if all tasks of a given graph G are completed, in which case we get some revenue. Next,
we show how each such graph can be represented by a single generalized read-once
rule, where agents represent tasks. In particular, each formula in the rule represents
an edge in G, as follows:∧
(ai ,aj )∈E
〈ai,aj〉 → revenue of the job defined by G.
An ordered coalition T represents the workforce that can finish tasks in a given or-
der. The total revenue of T is then equal to the sum of revenues of all jobs feasible
by T .
Having defined our representation formally, we now evaluate its properties. We start
with expressiveness.
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PROPOSITION 5.5 (EXPRESSIVENESS). Every ordered coalitional game can be expressed
using generalized read-once MC-Nets.
PROOF. For any arbitrary generalized characteristic function vg, we show how to
construct a set of rules GR such that Eq. (32) holds for every T ∈ T .
We will use only OAF to define a recursive set starting from singleton sequences and
empty set GR0 = ∅. Let SOAF be the ordered coalition corresponding to FOAF, and let
|FOAF| be the size of this formula.
GR1 = {〈ai〉 → vg((ai))} ∀ai ∈ N,
GRn =
⎧⎨







⎭ ∀|FOAF| = n.
Finally, we get GR = ⋃i GRi.
In this proof of Proposition 5.5, it emerges that only OAFs are necessary in order
to guarantee that the generalized MC-Nets are fully expressive. In the following basic
example, we present that in some games the BAF gives us desirable succinctness.
Example 5.6. Let N = {a1, . . . ,an} be the set of tasks. In order to get profit V , all
tasks must be done in arbitrary chosen order. It is clear that representing this problem
using only OAF requires n! number of formulas:
〈a1, . . . ,an〉 → V,
...
〈an, . . . ,a1〉 → V .
By introducing BAF, we can get exponentially more concise notation: {a1, . . . ,an} → V.
It is worth making some observations about the conciseness of our representation
scheme. Our rule-based representation scheme is ultimately based on propositional
formulae, and the use of these formulae is ultimately to define a Boolean function.
The use of propositional formulae to define Boolean functions is very standard: a very
fundamental result in the theory of propositional logic is that any Boolean function of
n Boolean arguments can be represented by a propositional formula in which the vari-
ables correspond to these arguments. For many Boolean functions, it might be possible
to obtain compact propositional formulae to represent them, but crucially, this will not
always be possible; some Boolean functions will require formulae of size exponential
in the number of variables (see, e.g., Boppana and Sipser [1990, p. 763]). It is, in fact,
trivial to produce examples of characteristic functions whose representation in our
framework is exponentially more succinct than explicitly listing the value of every
coalition, but from this discussion, it also follows that our representation cannot guar-
antee compactness in all cases. Finally, note that in the worst case, we can represent
a characteristic function with one rule for every possible input, which essentially cor-
responds to the idea of listing the value of every coalition. Thus, in the worst case, our
representation scheme is no worse than simply listing the value of every input. More
formally:
COROLLARY 5.7 (CONCISENESS). Compared to the generalized function game represen-
tation, generalized read-once MC-nets are at least as concise, and for certain games
exponentially more compact.
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5.2. Computing the NR Value with Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
In this section, we discuss the computational properties of the generalized read-once
MC-Net representation with respect to calculating the Nowak-Radzik value (i.e., the
NR value). We start our computational analysis with some observations about atomic
formulas. First, observe that all players occurring in some FBAF are indistinguishable.
Furthermore, taking into account that each player can appear in at most one formula,
φNR will assign to these players the same values. The case of FOAF is different. Here,
the NR value for all players except the last one is zero (see Example 3.4).
ALGORITHM 1: (COMP NR) Computing the NR value
Input: N = {a1, . . . ,an}, (F1 → V1), . . . , (Fr → Vr)
Output: φNRi for all ai ∈ N
1 for ai ∈ N do φNRi ← 0;
2 for j ← 1 to r do
3 m← |F j |;
4 (A, B, T, F) ← ShNR; // the Pseudo code of ShNR is in Appendix A
5 foreach ai ∈ XF j do
6 if ∃k Ak,i 
= 0 then
7 vi ← 1m!
∑m−1
k=0 (m− k− 1)!Ak,i ;
8 else if ∃k Bk,i 
= 0 then
9 vi ← − 1m!
∑m−1
k=0 (m− k− 1)!Bk,i;
10 else
11 vi ← 0;
12 φNRi ← φNRi + Vj · vi ;
THEOREM 5.8. Given a generalized coalitional game (N,GR), Algorithm 1 computes
the NR value (φNRi for all ai ∈ N) in polynomial time.
PROOF. We start by introducing necessary notation, some of which is in the pseu-
docode of Algorithm 1. For each formula F , we denote by XF the sets of players occur-
ring in F , and by |F | the size of XF , and by TF the set of all ordered coalitions within
the set XF , that is, TF =
⋃
C⊆XF (C). For all ai ∈ XF and k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, we define the
following quantities:
Ak,i(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F , (T ,ai)  F)|,
Bk,i(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F , (T ,ai)  F)|,
Tk(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,T  F |,
Fk(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,T  F |.
The first quantity Ak,i(F) is the number of ordered coalitions from TF of a given size k
(i.e., containing k players) to which the addition of player ai at the end of the coalition
causes the formula F to become satisfied. In contrast, the second quantity Bk,i is the
number of coalitions to which adding player ai causes the formula F to become unsat-
isfied. The last two quantities, Tk(F) and Fk(F), count the number of ordered coalition
being satisfied, and not satisfied, respectively, by the formula F . These quantities can
be computed recursively as follows. Let us first focus on the case where F is an atomic
formula. This case can be divided further into two cases:
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—F = {a1, . . . ,ar}: Here, Ak,i = (r − 1)! if k = r − 1 and i ∈ XF , otherwise Ak,i = 0. Bk,i
always equals 0. Tk = r! if k = r, otherwise Tk = 0. Finally, Fk = k! if k < r, otherwise
Fk = 0.
—F = 〈a1, . . . ,ar〉: Here Ak,i = 1 if k = r − 1 and i = r, otherwise Ak,i = 0. Bk,i always
equals 0. Tk = 1 if k = r, otherwise Tk = 0. Finally, Fk = k! − Tk if k ≤ r, otherwise
Fk = 0.
Having discussed the case where F is an atomic formula, we now consider the case
where F contains logical connectives. If such a connective involves two subformulas F1
and F2, then we know that ai can appear in F1 or F2, but not in both. We also know
that logical connectives used in the generalized read-once MC-Nets are symmetric, so
we will consider only one case, ai ∈ F1; the other is analogous.
In our analysis, for every two disjoint ordered coalitions, T1 and T2, we define a
conflation of T1 and T2 as an ordered coalition T such that (1) every agent in T
appears in T1 or T2, and (2) the order of the agents in T1 is retained in T , and the
order of those in T2 is also retained in T . The set of every conflation of T1 and T2 will
be denoted T1 × T2. More formally:
T ∈ T1 × T2 ⇐⇒ XT = XT1 ∪ XT2 ∧ T ′ ⊂T ∧ T2 ⊂T ,
where XT denotes a set of players in T . We note that, if T1  F and XF ∩ T2 = ∅, then
T  F∀T ∈ (T1 × T2).
PROPOSITION 5.9. Two ordered coalitions T1 and T2 can be conflated in ( |T1|+|T2||T2| ) ways.
PROOF. Consider an sequence of |T1| + |T2| empty slots, where each slot can take an
agent. Out of all these slots, choose any |T2| slots, and place in them the agents from T2
while retaining their order. As for the remaining slots, place in them the agents from
T1 while retaining their order. Clearly, every choice of the |T2| slots results in a unique
conflation, and every conflation can be constructed by exactly one such choice of the
|T2| slots. The number of conflations is then ( |T1|+1+|T2|−1|T2| ).
Next, we show how to compute Ak,i,Bk,i, Tk and Fk. We will do this for each of the
possible logical connective (i.e., ¬, ∧, ∨ and ⊕) separately:
—F = ¬F1. In this case, the negation swaps quantities as follows. For all i and k, we
have Ak,i(F) = Bk,i(F1), Bk,i(F) = Ak,i(F1), Tk(F) = Fk(F1), and Fk(F) = Tk(F1).
—F = F1 ∧ F2. In this case, let T ∈ T1 × T2, where T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈
(XF2 ), |T2| = k− s. We have (T ,ai)  F if and only if (T1,ai)  F1 and T2  F2. In









Furthermore, we have T  F if and only if T1  F1 and T2  F2. Additionally in this
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(F1)Fk−s(F2) + Fs(F1)Tk−s(F2) + Ts(F1)Fk−s(F2)).
—F = F1 ∨ F2. In this case, let T ∈ T1 × T2, where T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈
(XF2 ), |T2| = k − s. We know that T  F if and only if T1  F1 and T2  F2.









Analogously, we have (T ,ai)  F if and only if (T1,ai)  F1 and T2  F2, and, in this



























—F = F1 ⊕F2. Let T = T1 ×T2 such that T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈ (XF2 ), |T2| =
k− s. Now, the ordered coalition T can contribute to Ak,i in two ways. First, when
T1  F1 and T2  F2 and (T1,ai)  F1. Second, when T1  F1 and T2  F2 and

































These four quantities are computed recursively in the function ShNR, which is in-
voked in line 4 of Algorithm 1 (the pseudocode of ShNR can be found in Appendix A).
Note that Tk and Fk are only used to compute Ak,i and Bk,i, which are then used
in lines 7 and 9 of Algorithm 1 to compute φNR. Having proved the correctness of
computing Ak,i and Bk,i, it remains to prove that the way they are used in lines 7 and 9
correctly computes φNR. It suffices to prove this for a single ruleF → 1, as the extension
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to multiple rules is straightforward in the MC-Net representation. To this end, some
player ai can contribute to any ordered coalition T counted in Ak,i, or Bk,i (one of these
quantities is zero), if it appears in a random permutation right after the players from
T . The remaining players not occurring in T can be arranged in (m− k− 1)! ways (we














These are exactly lines 7 and 9 of Algorithm 1. This concludes the proof of correctness
of Algorithm 1. In terms of runtime, it is clear from the pseudocodes (in Algorithm 1
and Appendix A) that the total number of operations is polynomial in the number of
agents. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.8.
5.3. Computing the SB Value with Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
In this section, we discuss the computational properties of the generalized read-once
MC-Net representation with respect to calculating the Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os value (i.e.,
the SB value). We start our computational analysis with some observations about
atomic formulas. First, observe that all players occurring in some FBAF are indistin-
guishable. Furthermore, taking into account that each player can appear in at most
one formula, φSB will assign to these players the same values. Similarly, for the case
of FOAF, the SB value is the same for all players due to the symmetry axiom (see
Example 3.4).
Note that the SB value involves a different notion of marginal contribution. Whereas
computing quantities Tk and Fk remains the same, we need to redefine Ak,i and Bk,i.
Ak,i,l(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F , (T ,ai)l  F)|,
Bk,i,l(F) = |T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F , (T ,ai)l  F)|.
The first quantity Ak,i,l(F) is the number of ordered coalitions of a given size k for
which adding player ai on position l causes F to become satisfied. Bk,i,l is the num-
ber of coalitions in which adding the player ai on position l causes F to become
unsatisfied.
THEOREM 5.10. Given a generalized coalitional game (N,GR), Algorithm 2 computes
the SB value (φSBi for all ai ∈ N) in polynomial time.
PROOF. As for Tk and Fk, the computation is exactly the same as in the proof of
Theorem 5.8 NR. Therefore, we only need to show how to calculate Ak,i,l and Bk,i,l in
polynomial time. We will start from atomic formulas:
—F = {a1, . . . ,ar}. In this case, Ak,i,l = (r − 1)! if k = r − 1, i ∈ XF and l ∈ {1, . . . , r},
otherwise, Ak,i,l = 0. On the other hand, Bk,i,l = 0 for all k, i and l.
—F = 〈a1, . . . ,ar〉. Here, Ak,i,l = 1 if k = r − 1, i ∈ XF and l = i, otherwise Ak,i,l = 0. On
the other hand, Bk,i,l is always equal to 0.
In the next part of proof, we will use following proposition.
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ALGORITHM 2: (COMP SB) Computing the SB value
Input: N = {a1, . . . ,an}, (F1 → V1), . . . , (Fr → Vr)
Output: φSBi for all ai ∈ N
1 for ai ∈ N do φSBi ← 0;
2 for j ← 1 to r do
3 m← |F j |;
4 (A, B, T, F) ← ShSB(F j); // the Pseudo code of ShSB is in Appendix A
5 foreach ai ∈ XF j do
6 if ∃k,l Ak,i,l 
= 0 then






l=1 (m− k− 1)!Ak,i,l;
8 else if ∃k,l Bk,i,l 
= 0 then






l=1 (m− k− 1)!Bk,i,l;
10 else
11 vi ← 0;
12 φSBi ← φSBi + Vj · vi ;
PROPOSITION 5.11. The number of conflations of two ordered coalitions T1 and T2
such that s players from T2 go before the lth member of T1 equals
(
l + s − 1
s
)(




PROOF. Simply use combination with repetition twice.
Next, we show how to compute Ak,i,Bk,i for each of the possible logical connective (i.e.,
¬, ∧, ∨ and ⊕) separately. We will assume that ai ∈ XF1 .
—F = ¬F1. Here, the negation causes a swap between sets. That is, we have Ak,i,l(F) =
Bk,i,l(F1) and Bk,i,l(F) = Ak,i,l(F1) for all k, i, l.
—F = F1 ∧ F2. Let T = T1 × T2, where T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈ (XF2 ), |T2| =
k − s. We have (T ,ai)l  F if and only if (T1,ai)m  F1 for each m ≤ l when l − m
members of coalition T2 go before themth member of coalition T1 during the conflation
operation and T2  F2. In this case, T  F if and only if T1  F1. Consequently, using










k− l + 1
k− l + m− s
)
As,i,m(F1)Tk−s(F2).
Furthermore, we have T  F if and only if T1  F1 and T2  F2. Additionally in this
case, it holds that: (T ,ai)l  F ⇔ (T1,ai)m  F1 for m ≤ l, when l − m members of
coalition T2 go before the mth member of coalition T1 during the conflation operation










k− l + 1
k− l + m− s
)
Bs,i,m(F1)Tk−s(F2).
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—F = F1 ∨ F2. Once again let T = T1 × T2, where T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈
(XF2 ), |T2| = k − s. We know that T  F if and only if T1  F1 and T2  F2.











k− l + 1
k− l + m− s
)
As,i,m(F1)Fk−s(F2).
Analogously, we have (T ,ai)l  F if and only if (T1,ai)m  F1 for m ≤ l when l − m
members of coalition T2 go before themth member of coalition T1 during the conflation











k− l + 1
k− l + m− s
)
Bs,i,m(F1)Fk−s(F2).
—F = F1 ⊕F2. Let T = T1 ×T2 such that T1 ∈ (XF1 ), |T1| = s and T2 ∈ (XF2 ), |T2| =
k− s. Now, the ordered coalition T can contribute to Ak,i,l in two ways. First, when
T1  F1 and T2  F2 and (T1,ai)m  F1. Second, when T1  F1 and T2  F2 and
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These two quantities (together with Tk and Fk) are computed recursively in the func-
tion ShSB which is invoked in line 4 of Algorithm 2 (the pseudocode of ShSB can be
found in Appendix A).
Note that Tk and Fk are only used to compute Ak,i,l and Bk,i,l, which are then used
in lines 7 and 9 of Algorithm 2 to compute ShSB. Having proved the correctness of
computing Ak,i,l and Bk,i,l, it remains to prove that the way they are used in lines 7 and 9
correctly computes ShSB. It suffices to prove this for a single rule F → 1, as the
extension to multiple rules is straightforward in the MC-Net representation. To this
end, some player ai can contribute to any ordered coalition T counted in Ak,i,l, or Bk,i,l,
if it appears in a permutation right after the (l − 1)th player from T . The remaining
players (i.e., those not belonging to T ) can be arranged in (m− k− 1)! ways (we have
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These are exactly lines 7 and 9 of Algorithm 2. This concludes the proof of correctness
of Algorithm 2. In terms of runtime, it is clear from the pseudocodes (in Algorithm 2
and Appendix A) that the total number of operations is polynomial in the number of
agents. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Finally, it is worth making a few remarks about the problem of generating a rep-
resentation of a game in our framework. We know that given a representation of a
game in our framework, we can, for example, compute the NR and SB values in poly-
nomial time. But how hard is it to come up with a representation of a game in our
framework?
Suppose we are given a black box representation of a characteristic function, that is,
an oracle for the function that can be queried in unit time to determine the value of
any ordered coalition. Then, it is not hard to see that it will require time exponential
in the number of players to produce a representation of it in our framework. This is
because we cannot avoid having to query the oracle for the value of every possible
ordered coalition, and there are clearly exponentially many of them.
Another obvious question is whether other representations can easily be “translated”
to our representation. Here, we have better news. For example, a representation of a
game in Ieong and Shoham’s MC-Nets representation can be transformed into our
representation in polynomial time: MC-Net rules correspond directly to rules in our
framework requiring only basic atomic formulae (BAFs). In the same way, the sub-
graph representation introduced by Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] (which is, in fact,
a special case of the MC-Net representation) can also be translated into our framework
in polynomial time. Each edge of the graph translates to a rule with a BAF containing
only two players.
It is worth noting that we are not aware of any other attempts in the literature to
develop representations for generalized coalitional games. If such were developed, then
it would be interesting to consider the problem of translating between representations.
5.4. Sample Application: Computing Generalized Game-Theoretic Betweenness Centrality
As mentioned in the introduction, it is possible to use the game-theoretic solution
concepts, including the NR and SB values, to measure centrality of nodes in net-
works [del Pozo et al. 2011]. In this section, we show how to extend the classic notion
of betweenness centrality to generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality which
builds upon generalized characteristic function games and the NR and SB values.
After that, we show that it is possible to use generalized read-once MC-Nets to com-
pute the new centrality in time polynomial in the number of shortest paths in the
network.
Betweenness centrality, independently introduced by Anthonisse [1971] and
Freeman [1979], is one of the most important centrality measures. It quantifies the
ability of a node to control the flow in the network. The first step to construct it is to
calculate the number of all shortest paths between any pair of nodes in the network.
Then, betweenness centrality of node v is the proportion of shortest paths between any
pair of nodes in the network that traverse through v.
While betweenness centrality focuses on the role in the network played by indi-
vidual nodes, often it is important to consider the role played by groups of nodes.
To this end, Everett and Borgatti [1999] introduced the concept of group central-
ity and, in particular, the concept of group betweenness centrality. Essentially, this
measure works in exactly the same way as conventional betweenness centrality
but now the proportion of shortest paths that traverse through a given group of
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nodes, not a single node, is calculated. An interesting version of group betweenness
centrality was proposed by Puzis et al. [2007]. Their measure, called path between-
ness centrality, evaluates sequences of nodes and counts the proportion of short-
est paths that traverse along a given sequence of nodes in an appropriate order.
Formally:
Definition 5.12. Given a graph G = (V, E), we define the set of all ordered coalitions
of nodes in the graph, that is, T = ⋃C∈2V (C). The path betweenness centrality of the








where σst denotes the number of all shortest paths from s to t and σst(T ) is the number
of shortest paths from s to t passing through all nodes from T (if s ∈ T or t ∈ T then
σst(T ) = 0) such that the order of visited nodes is maintained (for path p we have
T ⊆p).
Similarly to other game-theoretic extension of classic centrality measures recently
considered in the literature [Michalak et al. 2013a, 2013b; Narayanam et al. 2014;
Skibski et al. 2014], this function, that assigns values to all ordered groups (coalitions)
of nodes, can be considered to be a value function, that is, in our case, the generalized
characteristic function. Now, the NR and SB values computed for this function become
the generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality.6
Definition 5.13. The generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality is a triple
(G, cpb, φ), where cpb is the path betweenness centrality, the value of each node v ∈ V
is given by φv(cpb), and φ is the NR value (φNR) or SB value (φSB).
Interestingly, some game-theoretic centrality measures can be computed in poly-
nomial time in the size of the network, that is, in the number of nodes and edges
[Szczepanski et al. 2014; Tarkowski et al. 2014]. While we did not obtain such a posi-
tive result for the generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality, we will now show
that it is possible to compute it in time polynomial in the number of shortest paths in
the network and with the help of our generalized read-once MC-Nets.
In particular, given a network G = (V, E), Algorithm 3 builds, for each shortest
path in the network, a corresponding generalized read-once rule. More specifically,
after initialization, we iterate over all shortest paths in the network. For each shortest
path, in line 7, we initialize the formula F with ordered atomic formula corresponding
to the sequence of all the nodes on the path. Next, in line 8, we add a conjunction
that ensures that no other nodes can appear in an ordered coalition that satisfies our
formula.
The size of the set GR constructed by this algorithm equals to the number of short-
est paths in the graph and can be exponential in the number of vertices. However,
in many graphs we have |GR|  T , which makes this algorithm much more effi-
cient than computing this measure directly using Eq. (9) or Eq. (12) for φNR and φSB,
respectively.
6We note that the game-theoretic betweenness centrality was introduced by Szczepan´ski et al. [2012, 2014]—
this measure, however, does not account for the order of players.
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ALGORITHM 3: Computing the generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality
Input: Graph G = (V, E), path betweenness centrality cpb, game solution φ
Output: φv for all v ∈ V
1 for v ∈ V do φv ← 0;
2 GR← ∅; // initialize the set of generalized read-once formulas
3 for v ∈ V do
4 for u ∈ V do
5 SP ← shortestPaths(v,u); // compute using a BFS algorithm all shortest paths from v to u
6 for (v, . . . ,u) ∈ SP do
7 F ← 〈v, . . . ,u〉;
8 F ← F ∧ ¬{V \XF };
9 V ← cpb((v, . . . ,u));
10 GR← GR ∪ (F → V );
11 if φ == φNR then
12 COMP NR(GR); // use Algorithm 1
13 else if φ == φSB then
14 COMP SB(GR); // use Algorithm 2
6. CONCLUSIONS
Generalized characteristic function games are attracting increasing interest in the
literature due to their manifold potential applications. In this article we considered
both the implementational and computational aspects of these games. In particular,
building upon the mechanism for the Shapley value by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998],
we proposed the first mechanism to implement two values for generalized charac-
teristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik value and the Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os
value. Furthermore, to facilitate efficient computations supporting this mecha-
nism, we proposed the Generalized Marginal-Contribution Nets representation—
the first computationally convenient formalism to model games with ordered
coalitions.
Whereas this work can be extended in various directions, two of them seem to be par-
ticularly interesting: (1) it would be interesting to consider representation formalisms
other than MC-Nets, such as Algebraic Decision Diagrams Aadithya et al. [2011] and
Sakurai et al. [2011], to model generalized characteristic function games, (2) it remains
an open question whether it is possible to implement the values for the generalized
characteristic function games by extending the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo’s and
Wettstein’s [2001] for the Shapley value. As mentioned in Section 2, this mechanism
has two advantages over the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998] (and, by ex-
tension, over our mechanism). First, the implementation is not in expected terms
since the Shapley value emerges in all equilibria. Second, it does not require any a
priori randomization of the order in which players make their moves. Nevertheless,
the mechanism by Pe´rez-Castrillo’s and Wettstein hinges upon the balanced contri-
bution property which is not satisfied by the NR value. As a result, at present, it
remains unknown whether it is possible to implement this value in such a spirit. Some
hope that it may be possible is given by the extensions of the original mechanism
by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein proposed by Ju and Wettstein [2009]. While these
extensions deal only with characteristic function games, they implement two solu-
tion concepts that do not meet the balanced contribution property: the equal surplus
value (see van den Brink and Funaki [2009]) and the consensus value (see Ju and
Wettstein [2007]).
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APPENDIXES
A. The Recursive Functions
ALGORITHM 4: ShNR(F)
Input: Formula F
Output: Quantities (A, B, T, F)
1 begin
2 if F = {a1, . . . ,ar} then
3 (A, B, T, F) ← (0, 0, 0, 0);
4 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do
5 for i ∈ XF do
6 if k = r − 1 then Ak,i ← (r − 1)!;
7 if k = r then Tk ← r!;
8 Fk ← k! − Tk;
9 else if F = 〈a1, . . . ,ar〉 then
10 (A, B, T, F) ← (0, 0, 0, 0);
11 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do
12 if k = r − 1 then Ak,r ← 1;
13 if k = r then Tk ← 1;
14 Fk ← k! − Tk;
15 else if F = ¬F1 then
16 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShNR(F1);
17 (A, B, T, F) ← (B1, A1, F1, T1);
18 else if F = F1 ∧ F2 then // We assume that ∀i∈XF i ∈ F1, the second situation is analogous.
19 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShNR(F1);
20 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShNR(F2);
21 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do




































k−s + F1sT2k−s + T1sF2k−s)
27 else if F = F1 ∨ F2 then
28 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShNR(F1);
29 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShNR(F2);
30 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do





































36 else if F = F1 ⊕ F2 then
37 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShNR(F1);
38 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShNR(F2);
39 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do





































ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 16, Publication date: October 2014.
Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games 16:31
ALGORITHM 5: ShSB(F)
Input: Formula F
Output: Quantities (A, B, T, F)
1 begin
2 if F = {a1, . . . ,ar} then
3 (A, B, T, F) ← (0, 0, 0, 0);
4 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do
5 for i ∈ XF , l ∈ {1, . . . , r} do
6 if k = r − 1 then Ak,i,l ← (r − 1)!;
7 if k = r then Tk ← r!;
8 Fk ← k! − Tk;
9 else if F = 〈a1, . . . ,ar〉 then
10 (A, B, T, F) ← (0, 0, 0, 0);
11 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do
12 for i ∈ XF do
13 if k = r − 1 then Ak,i,i ← 1;
14 if k = r then Tk ← 1;
15 Fk ← k! − Tk;
16 else if F = ¬F1 then
17 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShSB(F1);
18 (A, B, T, F) ← (B1, A1, F1, T1);
19 else if F = F1 ∧ F2 then // We assume that ∀i∈XF i ∈ F1, the second situation is analogous.
20 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShSB(F1);
21 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShSB(F2);
22 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do












































k−s + F1sT2k−s + T1sF2k−s);
28 else if F = F1 ∨ F2 then
29 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShSB(F1);
30 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShSB(F2);
31 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do













































37 else if F = F1 ⊕ F2 then
38 (A1, B1, T1, F1) ← ShSB(F1);
39 (A2, B2, T2, F2) ← ShSB(F2);
40 for k ∈ {0, . . . , r} do
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B. Main Notation Used in the Article
Players, coalitions, permutations
N The set of players.
n Cardinality of set N.
ai A player in N.
N−i The set of players N without player ai.
C, D A coalition.
S,T An ordered coalition.
(T , S)k The ordered coalition that results from inserting S at the kth position
in T .
(T ,ai) The ordered coalition that results from inserting ai at the end of T .
⊆ An extension of the notion of a subset to ordered sets (see
Definition 3.1).
(C) The set of all possible permutations of the players in C.
π A permutation.
inv(π ) The inverse of π .
π (C) The ordered coalition which consists of all the players in C and which
is ordered according to π .
Value functions, games, solution concepts
v The characteristic function.
vg The generalized characteristic function.
vg,π The characteristic function, where vg,π (C) = vg(π (C)).
(N, v) A coalitional game in a characteristic function form.
(N, vg) A coalitional game in a generalized characteristic function form.
(N, v¯g) The average game for vg (v¯g has the characteristic function form).
C←−π (i) A coalition that consists of all the players that are in permutation π
before ai .
v(C←−π (i),ai) The marginal contribution of player ai to C in the Shapley value
(Eq. (5)).
NRvg (T ,ai) The marginal contribution of player ai to T in the NR value.
SBvg (T ,ai) The marginal contribution of player ai to T in the SB value (Eq. (10)).
v¯g (C←−π (i),ai) The marginal contribution of player ai to C in the SB value (Eq. (5)).
φi(N, v) The Shapely value of player ai in game (N, v).
φNRi (N, vg) The Radzik-Nowak value of player ai in game (N, vg).
φSBi (N, vg) The Sa´nchez-Bergantin˜os value of player ai in game (N, vg).
E[·] The expectation operator.
ODCGNR and ODCGSB mechanisms
di A “demand” made by player ai .
ODCGNR/SBπ The subgame for the NR value and the SB value, respectively, given
π .
Hi The set of all histories that ai can face.
hi A history in Hi.
σ
NR/SB
π,i The strategy of player ai in ODCG
NR/SB
π .
MNRh,π (D) The maximum payoff that coalition D can obtain for itself if it is al-
lowed to optimally choose a set of new members C from the players
that precede ai .
Phπ (i, j) A linear program.
Representation
(z∧ ¬z′) → V Basic MC-Nets z positive literals, z′ positive literals,.
F Formula
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FBAF = {am, . . . ,an} basic atomic formula (BAF)
FOAF = 〈ai, . . . ,aj〉 ordered atomic formula (OAF)
F1 ⊕ F2 exclusive disjunction
T  F ordered coalition T meets or satisfies formula F
T  F ordered coalition T does not meet or satisfy formula F
(N,GR) generalized coalitional game represented by generalized read-once
MC-Net
XF set of players occurring in F
TF
⋃{(C) : C ⊆ XF }
T × S conflation of two ordered coalitions
Ak,i(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F, (T ,ai)  F)}|
Bk,i(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F, (T ,ai)  F)}|
Tk(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,T  F}|
Fk(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,T  F}|
Ak,i,l(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F, (T ,ai)l  F)}|
Bk,i,l(F) |{T ∈ TF : |T | = k,ai /∈ T ,T  F, (T ,ai)l  F)}|
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